The New Euro Corporatism

DM Campaign Director Marc Glendening identifies the areas of similarity between Pan-Europeanism and classical fascism and argues that, while Pan-Europeanism is not literally fascism, it can be described as the New Euro Corporatism.

There was more than a little irony in Tony Blair calling, in his recent sermon to the 2001 Labour Party conference, for decisive action against the Taliban because of the threat they pose to western democratic values. This from the man who has crushed opposition within his own party, emasculated parliament, and wants to hand over the running of the British economy to a group of unelected bankers in Frankfurt.

The recent atrocities in America are being used as a tool by those, like our Prime Minister, who are working to build a Pan-European system of government. In his Brighton Conference speech, Blair claimed that the terrorist attacks demonstrated the need for the single currency and greater general political integration. The government has announced that it fully supports the plan to impose a series of EU-wide 'anti-terrorism' measures and to speed up the process of creating a common legal area (see below). Several civil liberties groups, including Statewatch (which specifically monitors Brussels) and Liberty, have denounced the proposals as significant threats to justice. The EU's response to the events of 11 September 2001 makes ever more apparent the fact that the Pan-Europeanist project represents the biggest threat to liberal values in western Europe since the fascists were strutting their nasty stuff sixty years ago.

While acknowledging that there are important differences between the Euro-authoritarianism of today compared to the totalitarianism of the 1930s and '40s, I want to argue that there is nevertheless a disturbing degree of overlap between the two ideologies. Really existing Pan-Europeanism is a configuration of different components. It is a 'third way' that combines beliefs, structures, and policies that are drawn from both what have been traditionally thought of as the 'left' and 'right' of the political spectrum. Two examples are the monetarist strictures that accompany the single currency, on the one hand, and the Social Chapter, on the other. Any definition that is based on the abstraction of only one or two aspects of Pan-Europeanism will result in an inadequate understanding of this unique coming together of tendencies. If Pan-Europeanism is not literally fascism, it can be described as a New Euro Corporatism (NEC). The essence of NEC, like fascism, is the centralisation of power in the hands of an unaccountable elite that then subjects civil society to ever increasing degrees of governmental regulation.

This is not to say the two systems of thought are identical. First, while it is true that an opportunistic racism has been a tendency associated with the German Christian Democrats - in a recent regional election the party ran on the slogan "schools not immigrants" - it would nonetheless be inaccurate to claim that the vast majority of mainstream EU-statists are systematically racist. Whatever its faults, it is difficult to imagine Brussels waging a pogrom against members of ethnic minorities. Indeed, Brussels dishonestly uses the cause of anti-racism to justify many of its interventions that violate civil liberties.

Another distinction is the quantitative degree of state control over civil society that the EU and its mainstream adherents in the social and Christian democratic movements aspire to, compared to that achieved by fascism in the past. While today's Pan-Europeanists typically favour extensive state intrusions into the lives of individuals, they do not aspire to control the totality of human existence.

Stylistically, the two are also not the same. Fascism laid great emphasis on the idea of heroic leadership, mysticism, and theatricality. While the EU, like the totalitarian regimes of the past, is indeed waging a ceaseless campaign designed to indoctrinate its citizens (including schoolchildren); its propaganda output, other than possibly the grand guignole 'Captain Euro' web-site(1), does not possess the same high camp quality of its fascist counterpart. In appearance, Brussels displays about as much fascist menace as an IKEA showroom on early closing day.

This having been said, the following key areas of similarity between Pan-Europeanism and classical fascism can be identified.

Elite Rule

The current structure of EU government is based on the centralisation of power in the hands of an elite class of decision maker. It represents, as the Oxford academic Larry Siedentrop has argued in his book Democracy in Europe, a fundamental departure from the traditional Anglo-Saxon, liberal model of representative governance(2). It is an updated version of Hegel's ideal: the Prussion state's official philosopher advoated a system of government in which a permanent civil service elite ensures that the essential 'mission' of the state is pursued and protected and that political debate only takes place within highly restricted parameters.

While the EU is not a one party system, the bottom line is that as more and more powers are concentrated in Brussels, ordinary Europeans are finding their capacity to exercise any meaningful control over their rulers diminished. Elections to national parliaments are becoming reduced in significance and voting in farcical elections to the European Parliament does not, by definition, enable Europeans to determine who forms their government. The EU's three most important decision making bodies; the Commission (the EU's executive and embryonic government), the Council of Ministers, and the European Central Bank have no electoral mandate, meet behind closed doors, and their proceedings are subject to secrecy laws.

By voting in elections to the European Parliament, Europeans cannot affect the composition of the EU's most important institutions. Under article 107 it is even an offence for an MEP to write to the ECB urging it, say, to pursue a lower or higher interest rate. As Peter Hain MP once asked rhetorically in relation to the single currency (before Tony Blair offered him a job complete with his own chauffeur): "Why should monetary policy be taken out of democratic control and left to bankers?" Pan-Europeanism is the autocracy that dare not speak its name.

While the British government, like many of its European counterparts, makes rhetorical noises about the need for reform, there are no concrete plans for fundamental change. The new treaty of Nice will far from closing the democratic deficit, make it worse. Brussels will formally gain the right to withdraw the voting and representation rights within the Council of Ministers of states that are thought to be, in only vaguely defined terms, a potential threat to the essential values of the EU. This updating of the Brezhnev doctrine, of course, has already been (illegally) deployed against the Austrian government, supposedly because of the presence within its ranks of the right wing Austrian Freedom Party. However, it is interesting to note that twice in recent years the National Alliance, an overtly racist party that is the successor to Mussolini's movement, has twice helped to form coalition governments. Yet, Brussels has not threatened to apply sanctions against Italy. This is no doubt due to the fact that the National Alliance - unlike their Austrian equivalents - are enthusiastic adherents to the idea of EMU and greater political union. The real reason, it is only fair to conclude therefore, that the EU wants the new proposed Article 7, is to enable it to clamp down not on racist governments but on any member state that presents a potential obstacle to the unification process.

Peter Mandelson MP has predicted that,"'The era of pure representative democracy is coming to an end." But what is it he, and his fellow members in Britain in Europe, are working to replace it with?

Authoritarianism

Authoritarian regimes of 'right' and 'left' do not accept a hard boundary between the public and the private spheres. The notion that the individual has sacrosanct liberties, such as a right to free speech, that should not be violated by the state is an anathema to EU-statists from the social and Christian democratic traditions (the overwhelming majority).

The general mindset in the EU concerning basic human rights was shown in the judgement of the Court of First Instance relating to Bernard Connolly's appeal against his dismissal from the Commission for writing a book critical of EMU. The court ruled that criticism of the Union was tantamount to "blasphemy" in its legal consequences and hinted that when it evolves into a criminal jurisdiction it will take action to restrain criticism.(3)

The EU is in the process of putting in place a number of instruments and agencies that will give it the capacity to neutralise serious dissent. The deployment of the sinister range of powers Brussels is accumulating will, in all probability, only be used sparingly and at strategically key moments. The context within which state suppression takes place now is obviously more constrained than was the case sixty years ago or so. It is interesting to note in this context that the sanctions imposed against Austria were lifted once that country's government gave an undertaking that it would not block the Nice treaty and would commit itself to the European ideal. The Freedom Party duly caved in and changed its policy on Nice.

Article 191 of the Treaty of Nice will give the Council of Ministers, by qualified majority vote, the right to remove the funding rights of political parties that do not contribute to the creation of a Pan-Europeanist consciousness. In what liberal democracy are political parties deliberately handicapped for failing to adopt a particular ideological position? Article 52 of the Union's embryonic constitution, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, allows for the removal of civil liberties in the 'general interest' of the EU.

A police force is in place, EuroPol, whose agents will have unlimited powers of search and surveillance and will enjoy diplomatic immunity from prosecution. What should give civil libertarians across the political spectrum cause for concern is that, of the many loosely defined categories of criminality EuroPol is allowed to concern itself with, 'racism' and 'xenophobia' are totally undefined. Given that the EU's own Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia has defined opposition to the single currency as constituting "monetary xenophobia" then, presumably, EuroPol would be within its rights to take an interest in Lord David Owen's organisation, New Europe, or to bug Tony Benn's conversations with Arthur Scargill. In August, the Council of Ministers instructed EuroPol to "track and identify" anti-capitalist protestors throughout the EU as a means of trying to prevent further Genoa style demonstrations.(4)

As referred to earlier, Blair wants to impose, on the back of the terrorist crisis, a series of new Brussels-inspired civil liberties-violating measures. This includes automatic extradition to other parts of the Union (and so an end to habeas corpus and trial by jury for those who are the subject of these EU arrest warrants), and a common EU definition of terrorism which is so broad that any act of "intimidation" designed to alter "political, economic, or social structures" could theoretically get you arrested.

Corporatism

Brussels, like pre-war fascism, interprets society through a corporatist paradigm. This approach rejects the liberal view that society is an aggregate of individuals and that it evolves through their spontaneous and voluntary interaction. Corporatism, in contrast, understands society in terms of a body, 'corpus', made up of disparate groups (corporations, syndicates, or guilds in fascist parlance) that need to be brought together and reconciled in the interest of the whole. The state negotiates with the elites that are chosen to 'represent' the different social interests through an assembly of the corporations. A consensus is then achieved to which all must adhere. Individuals within special interests cannot deviate from the agreed settlement. There are parallels here with the 'communitarian' ideas that are very much in vogue with Tony Blair and other figures in New Labour. The fascist emblem taken from ancient Rome, the 'fasces', a bundle of rods bound together with an axe protruding through the centre, is meant to symbolise the idea of a fragmented society achieving order through a powerful state.

Fascism sought to transcend class conflict through its conception of the corporate state, a 'third way' between the free market and socialism. Oswald Mosley, the British fascist leader, once said famously, "I am not a man of the right or left, but of the centre". Continental Christian and social democracy have also adhered to this view of society and imposed joint bargaining procedures on employers representatives and trades union leaders in some EU member countries.

This ethos is very much in evidence within the EU. Brussels has its own version of a corporatist assembly, the Economic and Social Committee:

"Members of the Committee are drawn from a very broad range of activities in civil society. Some represent the employers and workers (the 'social partners'), while the daily activities of others range from commerce, transport to crafts, the professions… This process has a special utility which may not always be immediately apparent. By requiring its members to find common ground on each issue and to resolve conflicts of interest between the different economic and social groups, the Committee's work is a useful contribution to consensus building within the Union's legislative process."(5)

The emphasis that both liberals and the left put on the open expression of conflicting interests, parliamentary representation based on local communities (not 'corporations'), and competitive elections, is entirely absent when confronting the Economic and Social Committee. In any case, how are these 'representatives' chosen and by whom? To whom are they answerable? The existence of this committee offers one clue as to the enthusiasm for the Pan-European project that many powerful interests, such as the Round Table of European Industrialists and the CBI, display. They have the resources and pull to ensure that they get to have 'representatives' on such bodies and that their voice can be heard loud and clear in Brussels. It is far less time consuming and expensive than having to lobby and schmooze fifteen different sets of politicians. The political unaccountability of those Big Business are trying to influence is also a huge attraction. And, of course, the small and medium-sized business sector is relatively disorganised politically and therefore not as potent. Again, another parallel with the fascist period.

Dirigisme

The fascist economy was characterised by private ownership of the means of production. However, this was not free market capitalism, but a system tightly regulated by a mass of directives designed to ensure that businessmen accorded with the objectives and priorities of the regime. The use of regulation rather than direct ownership of enterprises was one major distinction between fascism and Marxism.

Likewise, in the EU context, directives compelling privatisation are combined with those laying down conditions of employment such as the 48-hour working week law. This inclination towards bureaucratic intervention in the affairs of the private sector is often done with the encouragement not only of trades unions but also of big business that has the financial and administrative means to cope with these demands, whereas smaller rivals are less able to accommodate them.

Pan-Europeanism

As John Laughland demonstrates in his book The Tainted Source, fascists and Nazis contrary to popular belief, were not defenders of the nation-state system. Many of the Pan-Europeanists of the past had fascist backgrounds. Robert Schuman, for example, was a minister in the Vichy administration (itself a vocal protagonist for European unity). Francois Mitterand was also an active Vichyite. In part, the cause of a politically unified continent mirrored the fascist belief that domestic order could only come about as a consequence of an omnipotent state. Internationally, they saw a fragmented continent based on individual sovereign nations as a recipe for chaos and conflict: "Corporations would be the basis for a social unity within nations and, by extension, also for unity and reconciliation between nations; a system applied nationally to bring about inter-class harmony would, when applied internationally, make for collaboration among nations."(6)

An additional benefit, from a fascist perspective, resulting from the demise of traditional nations, is the idea that the bigger the political jurisdiction territorially and in terms of financial wealth, the more powerful the state. Mussolini addressing the Italian National Council of Corporations in 1933 said: "'Europe may once again grasp the helm of world civilisation if it can develop a modicum of political unity."

Oswald Mosley, writing in the 1950s, expressed the view that European countries were too small to remain self-governing: "Whole industries in a country like Britain can be put out of business by a fluctuation in world demand, or a change in the world price level, occasioned by these industrial giants whose own economies are large enough and sufficiently self-contained to be independent of world events..." The need, he claimed, was for a '"European government in command of an area so great as Europe-Africa, and animated by the guiding principle of a complete economic leadership of industry by government." (7)

This mindset, of course, finds echoes today in the rhetoric of Jospin, Schroder, Blair and others who talk about creating a 'superpower' that will be able to rival the United States. Romano Prodi, like Mitterand and Kohl before him, refers repeatedly to the idea of recreating the Roman empire. Hence the importance attached to the creation of a common army and foreign policy.

Conclusion

These areas of overlap between New Euro Corporatism and classical fascism do not concern peripheral areas of politics. They relate to issues and questions that are of central importance to any ideology: social frame of analysis; governmental structures; mode of economic organisation; the national question; attitude to the individual-state relationship; among others.

NEC is, in reality, the dominant ideological profile of the EU. There are, of course, advocates of an EU state that genuinely want it be based on liberal and/or democratic principles. This tendency is very small indeed and tends to be found only in the Italian European Movement, the Union of Young European Federalists, and isolated individuals scattered through more mainstream pro-EU parties and groups. However, no democratic Pan-European state - leaving aside the question of whether or not this is possible in practice or desirable - is actually on the menu. Most Pan-Europeanists, such as the British Liberal Democrats proclaim their desire at every opportunity to see the EU's structures transformed. But when push comes to shove, despite their pious rhetoric, they always end up supporting the transfer of more powers to the really existing, undemocratic European Union, as characterised above. The choice, effectively, for all Europeans is between national democracy (with all its imperfections) and the authoritarian system described earlier.

The over-riding priority for all those who wish to live in a society in which they can exercise some degree of democratic oversight over the political class, and keep open the option of radically different political approaches, is to form a popular front against the authoritarian corporatists. Broader ideological differences must take a back seat. The stark reality is that Pan-Europeanism represents the most potent threat to western democracy since the Second World War.

(1) See www.captaineuro.com
(2) Larry Siedentop (2001) Democracy in Europe, London: Penguin Books, p.31 of this issue
(3) Bernard Connolly (2001) "A dissident speaks out", European Journal 8(6): 2-4
(May)
(4) The Independent, 20 August 2001
(5) Serving the European Union: A citizen's guide to the institutions of the European Union (1996), Brussels: European Commission, p.24-25
(6) John Morgan, quoted in John Laughland (1997), The Tainted Source: The Undemocratic Origins of the European Idea, London: Warner Books, p.49
(7) Oswald Mosley (1997), Revolution by Reason, The Edwin Mellen Press, p.154-7

This article first appeared in the October 2001 edition of the European Journal, published by the European Foundation.

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